





































In January 2020 the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) declared a Public He-
alth Emergency of International Con-
cern (PHEIC) following the outbreak 
of the coronavirus (COVID-19). In 
March 2020 cases of the COVID-19 in-
1 I thank Petra Domazet, a graduate student 
at the University of Zagreb, for her help 
with coding.
fection were reported across the globe 
leading WHO to declare global pande-
mic. Hasty spread of the virus and the 
galloping number of infections forced 
leaders to call for desperate measures, 
including restriction of people's mo-
vements, closure of borders, schools, 
stores and restaurants, curfews etc. The 
world has found itself in an unprece-
dented crisis.
COMMunICatInG COVID-19 
PanDeMIC: MeDIa COVeraGe 
Of the heaDquarters anD 
the use Of PersuasIOn 
strateGIes In CrOatIa
Abstract In february 2020 Croatia was affected by the COVID-19 global pandemic. 
a challenging task of communicating the pandemic was assumed by the people 
associated with the headquarters of Civil Protection of the republic of Croatia. the 
goal of this study was to examine how three of them were covered in the media 
and to test if and how they were using pandemic-related strategies of persuasion 
to achieve public compliance. the findings indicate that the coverage of the key 
communicators during the first three months of the pandemic was overwhelmin-
gly positive. Moreover, in the early stages of the pandemic none of the examined 
news sites was really pushing issues or angles that questioned pandemic-related 
policies or actions of the headquarters. examination of the rhetoric of the key co-
ronavirus communicators has established that they have embraced persuasive 
strategies that are typical of pandemic communication, most notably the use of 
fear appeals, military metaphors and insistence on messages of 'togetherness' and 
conversely, 'pandemic shaming'. the article concludes that professional credibili-
ty and favorable media representation of Croatian coronavirus envoys, along with 
adopted persuasive strategies, have probably encouraged people to trust their de-
cisions and comply with restrictive measures that have suspended their freedoms 
and changed their life routines almost overnight.
Key words COVID-19 pandemic, coronavirus, communication, persuasion, experts, 
fear-appeals, headquarters, Croatia
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The first case of the coronavirus in-
fection in Croatia was registered in Feb-
ruary 2020. Shortly after, The Civil Pro-
tection Headquarters of the Republic of 
Croatia was appointed to manage and 
communicate all pandemic-related mat-
ters. Four people from the team soon 
emerged as the faces of the battle against 
the virus: Vili Beroš, Croatian Minister 
of Health, Davor Božinović, Minister of 
Interior Affairs, Krunoslav Capak, the 
head of Croatian Institute for Public 
Health, and Alemka Markotić, the head 
of the Clinic for Infective Diseases 'Dr. 
Fran Mihaljević'. They communicated 
mainly through daily press conferences 
that became the central media event for 
citizens confined to their homes. The 
media and pundits praised 'the fantas-
tic four' for their expertise, credibility, 
and sober communication. Commonly 
skeptical and distrustful citizens cham-
pioned the efforts of the Headquarters 
and went along with their instructions.
The underlying assumption of this pa-
per is that the flattering media image of 
the key communicators, along with their 
use of specific persuasive strategies, 
played important role in convincing 
people to adapt their behavior and com-
ply with measures that heavily restrict-
ed their freedom during the 'first wave' 
of the pandemic in Croatia. Achieving 
compliance in a country with one of the 
lowest levels of trust in institutions in 
the EU was a daring task. Therefore, the 
idea of analyzing the factors that might 
have convinced the public to trust public 
authorities and consequently align with 
their recommendations seems both in-
triguing and relevant.
The goal of this study is two-fold. 
First, it wants to test the impression that 
the media coverage of the key commu-
nicators during the 'first wave' of the 
pandemic was unusually favorable. Such 
impression stands in stark contrast with 
commonly negative news coverage of 
public authorities in Croatia. The sec-
ond goal is to establish how the crisis 
team in Croatia was using specific per-
suasive strategies that had proven effec-
tive in achieving compliance in previous 
pandemics.
The theoretical section of the paper 
looks at the elements that contribute to 
efficient crisis risk communication in 
times of health emergencies. It specifi-
cally focuses on the role of experts and 
their contribution to achieving public 
trust, as a crucial precondition for peo-
ple to accept proposed behavior chang-
es. Previous research has shown that in 
health crisis people tend to trust experts 
more than they trust politicians, while 
politicians on the other hand refer to 
'epistemic authority' of experts to justify 
unpopular measures. The section then 
discusses the use of fear-based tactics, 
including the use of military metaphors 
and 'pandemic shaming' that seem 
abundantly present in the discourse of 
the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic.
The analytical section of the paper 
examines media coverage of the three 
most prominent Headquarters' figures, 
Vili Beroš, Davor Božinović and Alem-
ka Markotić and their rhetoric. The first 
part of this section builds on the idea 
that experts assume public stage in pan-
demics, and it investigates how Beroš, 
Božinović and Markotić were repre-
sented in the media. Although Beroš 
and Božinović are politicians, Beroš and 
Markotić assumed role of chief medical 
experts and the impression was that the 
credibility assigned to the team by the 
media was the one of experts capable to 
navigate the crisis. It uses quantitative 
content analysis to examine sentiment 
of news reports and then it resorts to 
qualitative analysis to deconstruct ex-
emplary patterns used to report about 
selected Headquarters' members from 





































The second part of the research sec-
tion examines if and how the rhetoric of 
the Headquarters in Croatia embraced 
persuasive strategies that are typical of 
pandemic communication, most nota-
bly the use of fear appeals, military met-
aphors and insistence on the messages 
of togetherness and conversely, 'pan-
demic shaming'.
Compliance and behavior 
change in health communication
Health communication is a discipline 
aimed at preventing diseases through 
'behavior modification' (Freimuth et al. 
2000: 337). According to Reynolds and 
Seeger (2005), in times of large-scale 
threats, effective health communication 
should be a merger between crisis com-
munication and emergency risk commu-
nication. The central goal of crisis com-
munication is 'to strategically defend 
and explain the organization's position 
in the face of crisis induced criticism, 
threat, and uncertainty' (Reynolds and 
Seeger 2005: 46.). The main objective 
of risk communication is to persuade 
the public that their wellbeing is at risk 
and that they should modify their be-
havior and introduce changes into their 
lifestyle in order to alleviate the threat 
(Reynolds and Seeger 2005: 47). Risk 
communication commonly relies on dif-
ferent persuasive strategies to convince 
the public that the threat is real and that 
they should adhere to proposed behav-
ior changes. Two strategies seem espe-
cially efficient in that respect: the use of 
credible experts with solid communica-
tion skills and the use of fear appeals.
Freimuth et al. (2000: 338) argue that 
'scientifically based messages from cred-
ible sources' are a vital part of all health 
communication. Reynolds and Seeger 
(2005: 45) likewise suggest that 'cred-
ibility is important to the believability 
and effectiveness of messages'. Evi-
dence from previous pandemics indeed 
demonstrates that trust in health agents 
positively affected people's willing-
ness to accept recommended behavior 
(Siegrist and Zingg 2014).
The dripping evidence from the 
COVID-19 pandemic also indicate 
that medical experts appear crucial in 
achieving compliance and accepting 
proposed behavior changes. Accord-
ing to Lavazza and Farina (2020: 1), in 
the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic medical 
experts of all sorts but especially 'viro-
logists, epidemiologists, public health 
scholars, and statisticians' have been 
instrumental in fighting the virus. The-
ir knowledge has been used by policy 
makers to tame and fight the pandemic 
while their 'epistemic authority' has 
been employed to justify and imple-
ment unpopular measures that limited 
people's freedom. The authors rely on 
WHO data to argue that despite incre-
asing doubt in mainstream medicine, 
the rise of anti-vaxxer movement and 
other similar trends, 'experts still main-
tain their epistemic authority among the 
public in the biomedical field' (2020: 2). 
They believe that in the 2020 pandemic, 
trust in experts and their authority has 
been crucial in persuading people to 
adhere to 'socially demanding measures 
(such as enforced quarantine)' (2020: 
5). In that respect, Renata Rašović from 
Večernji list wonders: if it wasn't for per-
ceived expertise of the front figures of 
Croatian crisis team, 'would we be will-
ing to sacrifice our personal freedom 
and uncritically obey the orders issued 
by Vili Beroš, Alemka Markotić and 
Krunoslav Capak?' (Večernji.hr 2020). 
After realizing the scale of the threat, 
'most of the people began trusting ex-
perts more than their elected represen-
tatives', assert Lavazza and Farina (2020: 
2). Media facilitated the process by giv-
ing experts a forum and hailing their 
competence and credibility. Moreover, 

























the world acquired the status of 'house-
hold names'' (Henley 2020) and even su-
perstars. This is very much in line with 
arguments about increased 'celebritiza-
tion' of society and 'celebrification' of 
individuals by which ordinary people or 
public figures from different social fields 
acquire celebrity status (Driessens 2013: 
643). According to Driessens (2013), 
the process of celebrification has trans-
gressed the boundaries of showbusiness 
or fashion and is nowadays well present 
in academia, medicine, and numerous 
other fields. Craig (2020: 3) observes 
that Anthony Fauci, the top infectious 
disease expert in the US, 'has emerged 
as much as media metaphor as medical 
expert' or 'a spectacularized Marvel su-
perhero'. Building on the evidence that 
celebrities have 'significant influence on 
a range of health behaviors' (Caulfield 
and Fahy 2016: 25), it seems plausible 
to assume that in some cases, celebrit-
yhood of the chief medical experts in 
the 2020 pandemic may have amplified 
their epistemic authority.
The accounts of previous pandemics 
indicate that the impact of experts' mes-
sages is greater if some level of 'efficacy', 
meaning notion that proposed measures 
and actions are indeed reducing the risk 
of the disease, is involved (Witte and 
Allen 2000). The same is true for the 
other powerful strategy of persuasion 
in health emergencies – the use of fear 
appeals.
Fear appeals or 'scare tactics' are com-
monly used in health crisis to encourage 
behavior change. They seem especial-
ly effective when combined with what 
Witte and Allen (2000: 607) identified as 
'high-efficacy messages': people will act 
in line with recommendations if they 
believe that proposed safeguarding mea-
sures are efficient and that they are able 
to protect themselves. Witte and Allen 
(2020) recommend a range of fear-based 
tactics that may enhance compliance. 
For instance, they instruct communi-
cators to emphasize the severity of the 
threat, to use strong language and pic-
tures to portray the consequences of the 
disease, and to personalize the language 
in order to make people believe that 
they are personally vulnerable and sus-
ceptible to the disease (2000: 606).
Media, with their tendency to 'reduce 
and simplify, exaggerate and sensation-
alize' (Bjørkdahl and Carlsen 2017: 359) 
act as a reliable helping hand in disse-
minating fear appeals. When analyzing 
the media coverage of the H1N1 pan-
demic in 2009, colloquially known as 
the 'swine flu', Bjørkdahl and Carlsen 
(2017) concluded that the 'panic, in this 
first period, seemed to be spreading fa-
ster than the disease itself '. More than 
a decade later, in the midst of the 2020 
pandemic, almost the same phrasing 
was used to address frantic media repor-
ting about the novelty virus (e.g. Specia 
2020), as well as the spread of rumors 
and disinformation via social media, 
consequently dubbed as the 'infodemic' 
(e.g. Radu 2020).
In the case of the COVID-19 pan-
demic, common scare tactics included 
the use of exaggerated and provocative 
language, display of explicit images of 
the people who died from coronavirus 
and stigmatization of those who do 
not comply with the rules (those who 
do not physically distance, wear masks 
etc.) (Stolow et al. 2020: 531). The latter 
came to be known as 'pandemic sha-
ming'. Jeniffer Weiner from The New 
York Times (2020) argues that the fear 
and uncertainty may have encouraged 
people to scrutinize, shame and 'snitch' 
uncompliant neighbors. Fear has been 
a key divider between 'us', who share a 
strong sense of connectivity, care and to-
getherness, and 'them' who refuse to res-
pect the rules and consequently put 'us' 
at risk. Implicit to this divide between 





































is why Sobande (2020: 2) finds the fra-
ming of the COVID-19 pandemic as a 
'force that is bringing people together' 
hypocritical. Gardiner and Fulfer (2020) 
similarly argue that the solidarity that 
has been communicated throughout 
the 2020 pandemic is a narrow, limited 
kind of solidarity because it is based on 
fear for our individual health and safety 
while on the other hand it neglects or 
even amplifies social inequities. They 
argue that 'a positive view of solidarity 
in pandemic times must move beyond 
compliance with government or public 
health directives' towards a more inclu-
sive political community (2020: 8). The-
ir discussion builds on Hanna Arendt's 
(1968) differentiation between 'negative' 
and 'positive' solidarity. Negative so-
lidarity is based on fear and common 
experience of suffering and sense of to-
getherness is being generated through 
'identification with a common bad' rat-
her than through 'pursuit of a common 
good' (Hayden and Saunders 2019: 15, 
original emphasis) On the other hand, 
Arendt's positive solidarity occurs when 
individuals 'put their efforts towards 
actively resisting oppression and injusti-
ce' and 'improving their common con-
dition' in 'the inclusive space that lies 
between unique yet equal people' (Hay-
den and Saunders 2019: 15).
Another powerful fear-based instru-
ment that has been extensively used in 
pandemics is the metaphors, especially 
military metaphors that are, according 
to Craig (2020: 2) 'abundant in dis-
courses of plagues'. Machin and Mayr 
(2012: 165) argue that metaphors are an 
important discursive strategy used to 
'transport processes of understanding 
from one realm or conceptual domain 
to another'. They can be 'deliberately 
persuasive and often conceal under-
ling power relations' (2012: 221). Craig 
(2020) critically addresses instrumen-
tal use of metaphors to frame diseases. 
He brings up Susan Sontag's acclaimed 
1989 essay about AIDS in which she 
condemns stigmatizing power of meta-
phors. She argued that metaphors were 
used to politically weaponize AIDS 
(Craig 2020: 2). Craig draws a parallel 
with the rhetoric of the COVID 19 that 
includes use of 'military commands', 
such as 'stay at home', 'shelter in place', 
appreciation for 'front-line workers' and 
other military associations (3). Discon-
tent with the use of language of war in 
communicating the 2020 pandemic 
seems widespread and has given rise 
to the projects such as #ReframeCovid 
which is aimed at promoting 'non-war 
related language on Covid-19'.2
The evidence from 2020 crisis seems 
to confirm findings from previous pan-
demics about the fundamental role of 
experts and efficacy of fear appeals. 
Lavazza and Farina (2020) assert that 
countries that give priority to the au-
thority of experts over political author-
ities are more likely to gain public trust. 
Early accounts from COVID-19 pan-
demic indicate that fear-based messages 
and strategies have been prominently 
used by governments in fighting coro-
navirus. At the same time, scholars and 
citizens raise concerns about militariza-
tion of pandemic discourse and the ad-
vance of discriminating discourses that 
encourage social divides. Finally, they 
criticize the hypocrisy of alleged togeth-
erness and question the frankness of 
pandemic solidarity.
COVID -19 in Croatia: The 
Context of the 'First Wave'
At the time of the coronavirus outbreak, 
Croatia was governed by the conservati-
ve Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvat-
ska demokratska zajednica, HDZ) and 
its partners. The Prime Minister was a 
2 https://sites.google.com/view/reframe-


























moderate conservative Andrej Plenko-
vić who took over the helm of the party 
and the country in 2016. From January 
until June 2020 Croatia presided the Co-
uncil of the European Union. Its entire 
presidency was marked by an unprece-
dented global crisis caused by the CO-
VID-19 pandemic.
The trust in institutions in Croatia is 
generally amongst the lowest in the EU 
(Henjak, 2017). According to the Euro-
barometer, only 15% of respondents in 
Croatia tend to trust the Government 
while 16% tend to trust the parliament.3 
In comparison, the average trust in na-
tional governments and parliaments in 
the EU is 34%, for both institutions. Mo-
reover, in February 2020, just before the 
outbreak, 70 percent of respondents inc-
luded in a regular monthly IPSOS sur-
vey believed that Croatia was heading in 
the wrong direction.4
The first COVID-19 case was reported 
in Croatia on 24 February 2020. Shortly 
after, The Civil Protection Headquarters 
of the Republic of Croatia was appoint-
ed the main decision making and crisis 
communication body for all epidemic 
(later pandemic) related matters. It has 
been mainly represented by four people 
who came to embody the battle against 
the virus: Vili Beroš, the HDZ's Minister 
of Health, Davor Božinović, the HDZ's 
Minister of Interior Affairs, Krunoslav 
Capak, the head of Croatian Institute for 
Public Health and Alemka Markotić, the 
head of the Clinic for Infective Diseas-
es 'Dr. Fran Mihaljević'. Božinović has 
been the leader of the Headquarters, Ca-
3 Eurobarometer (November 2019) file:///C:/
Users/Korisnik/Downloads/eb92_nat_hr_
hr.pdf
4 Dnevnik.hr (25 March 2020): Imaju li 
Vlada i predsjednik podršku građana u 




html. (Accessed 15 September 2020).
pak has been the member while Beroš 
and Markotić have been associate mem-
bers. The media will soon brand them as 
'the fantastic four' (Horvat 2020).
In the early days of the spread in Cro-
atia, the virus was perceived 'as danger-
ous as a flu' (Večernji.hr 26 February 
2020). However, as the alarming scenes 
from Italian regions Veneto and Lom-
bardy were mounting and the number 
of infected people in Croatia started to 
rise, the rhetoric of the Headquarters 
became more upsetting. On 26 Febru-
ary 2020 Davor Božinović introduced 
daily press conferences that will become 
the main media event in the following 
weeks. The conferences first took place 
twice a day, at 9 AM and 4 PM and af-
terwards once a day, at 2 PM. They were 
held continuously until 18 May 2020. 
The most anticipated information deliv-
ered at the conferences was the number 
of people directly affected by COVID 
– 19 – infected, deceased, people in 
quarantine etc. The main speakers at 
the conferences were Beroš, Božinović, 
Markotić and Capak.
On 16 March 2020, all schools in Cro-
atia went online and soon after other re-
strictions were imposed: all restaurants, 
caffes and stores were closed except for 
supermarkets, pharmacies and drug-
stores, public events and gatherings were 
banned, and public transportation was 
halted. A week later, on 22 March 2020, 
Zagreb was hit by a strong earthquake 
that ruined parts of the city and left 
many people homeless. The earthquake 
urged many people to flee Zagreb which 
led the Headquarters to restrict inter-city 
movements of people. From 23 March 
2020 commuting between cities was 
possible only with a special pass issued 
by state or local authorities. Croatia was 
now officially in a lockdown. Accord-
ing to the report released by The Ox-
ford COVID-19 Government Response 





































Croatia was among the countries with 
the most rigorous pandemic response 
in Europe.5 The infliction of restrictive 
measures was accompanied by pervasive 
public campaign that encouraged people 
to protect themselves and 'stay at home' 
(#ostanidoma). The campaign was fero-
ciously supported by the media. On 17 
March 2020 editors of selected news me-
dia were summoned by the Government 
to a briefing about COVID-19 reporting. 
The agenda of the meeting was allegedly 
to instruct the media to reduce the panic 
and stop the spread of disinformation. 
Croatian Journalists' Association and 
the media that were not invited strongly 
criticized the meeting. Nevertheless, all 
mainstream media outlets endorsed 'stay 
at home' directions.
On 27 April 2020, the restrictions 
started to loosen up. On 11 May 2020 
schools re-opened for younger children, 
along with restaurants and bars and 
the ban on inter-city travels was abolis-
hed. Croatia was slowly returning to its 
(new) normal.
The handling of the pandemic in Cro-
atia throughout February, March and 
April 2020 was generally perceived as ti-
mely, adequate, and successful, while the 
actions of the Headquarters were hardly 
challenged or disputed. In April 2020, 
IPSOS registered a surprising surge in 
public optimism: 51 percent of respon-
dents thought the country was going in 
the right direction.6 This was probably 
due to a confidence the citizens felt about 
5 Coronavirus Government Response Trac-
ker, https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/
research-projects/coronavirus-government- 
response-tracker. (Accessed 15 September 
2020). 
6 Dnevnik.hr (24 April 2020) HDZ povećao 
prednost pred SDP-om, popularnost raste 
i Plenkoviću i Milanoviću. https://dnevnik.
hr/vijesti/hrvatska/crobarometar-popular-
nost-stranaka-i-politicara-u-vrijeme-ko-
rona-krize---602923.html. (Accessed 15 
September 2020).
how the crisis was being handled. In the 
same month, Minister Vili Beroš emer-
ged as the most popular politician in the 
country for 29.2 respondents compared 
to only 2 percent in March 2020, which 
is the biggest surge in personal rating in 
the history of CRO Demoscop, a regular 
political monthly survey conducted by 
Promocija Puls.7
In May 2020 the public mood shifted 
back to pessimism, with 61 percent of 
respondents thinking that country was 
going in the wrong direction to furt-
her deteriorate in June 2020 with 70 
percent of the respondents thinking 
that the country was not doing well. 8 
Personal rating of Vili Beroš also star-
ted to deflate – he emerged as the most 
positive politician for 15.4 percent of 
respondents in May and 8.1 percent in 
June 2020.9
7 Maretić Žonja, Petra (5 April 2020) Nakon 
tri mjeseca HDZ ponovno prvi izbor gra-
đana, a a Beroš najpozitivniji političar. 
Večernji list. https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/ 
neocekivana-promjena-u-jeku-krize-poli-
ticari-ce-morati-opravdati-velika- ocekiva-
nja-1392018. (Accessed 10 November 2020).
8 Dnevnik.hr (25 May 2020): Crobarome-
tar otkriva odnos snaga mjesec dana prije 




tama---606754.html. (Accessed 15 Sep-
tember 2020). Dnevnik.hr (26 June 2020) 




je-zene---610790.html. (Accessed 15 Sep-
tember 2020).
9 Gregoret, Damira (7 June 2020): Novi 
CRO Demoskop: Preokret na vrhu, Restart 
































However, the overall perception of the 
Headquarters' response to the pandemic 
remained flattering in June 2020. Accor-
ding to Promocija Plus, 76.6 percent of 
respondents thought that the measu-
res imposed by the Headquarters were 
well balanced while 87.2 percent said 
that they trusted or entirely trusted the 
Headquarters and their measures. 10 By 
November 2020, the support for the He-
adquarters shrunk to 36 percent and su-
pport for the measures to 41.9 percent.11
Methodology and 
research design
The goal of this study is to analyze fea-
tures of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic 
communication that may have encoura-
ged Croatian public to comply with the 
new framework of life based on restri-
ctions. It uses textual analysis to exami-
ne communication related to the CO-
VID-19 pandemics in Croatia on two 
levels. First, it examines media coverage 
of three key individuals who acted on 
behalf of the Civil Protection Headqu-
arters of the Republic of Croatia – Vili 
Beroš, Davor Božinović and Alemka 
Markotić. For the reasons of feasibili-
ty (primarily related to data processing 
and time constraints) the decision was 
made to exclude Krunoslav Capak from 
the study. Pilot analysis has indicated 
10 Net.hr (6 June 2020). Veliko istraživanje: 
Jesu li mjere bile pretjerane? Građani su rekli 





(Accessed 28 September 2020).
11 Gregoret, Damira (7 November 2020): 
Koliko građana podržava lockdown, a što 





lanu-stozera-najvise-vjeruju/ (Accessed 10 
November 2020). 
that he was the least exposed member of 
the Headquarters and that the study will 
not be compromised if this concession 
is made. However, further analyses of 
the Headquarters' role in the 2020 pan-
demic in Croatia should include Capak 
whose role and public visibility increa-
sed in the later stages of the pandemic.
The underlying assumption is that the 
favorable media representation of the 
individuals who were perceived as the 
faces of the battle against the pandemics 
may have been important in boosting 
their authority, and consequently their 
ability to persuade otherwise pessimistic 
and distrustful citizens.
The analysis of the news coverage re-
lies on both quantitative and qualitative 
content analysis. The unit of analysis is 
one online article.
The second goal is to investigate dis-
cursive strategies and persuasive tech-
niques used by Beroš, Markotić and 
Božinović to encourage citizens to act 
in accordance with imposed measures. 
Their statements are examined using 
qualitative content analysis. The 'state-
ment' is here understood as the totality 
of all direct or paraphrased words as-
signed to one person in one article. All 
media outlets covered press conferences 
of the Headquarters and most of them 
aired or published same or similar re-
ports, based on what was said that day 
at the conference. Although unmediat-
ed transcripts from press conferences 
would be more appropriate for this type 
of analysis, the presence of exhaustive 
press conference reports across differ-
ent media outlets, including Index.hr 
and Večernji.hr, justifies the choice of 
material. This limitation of news articles 
is the immanent presence of the media 
filter that needs to be acknowledged and 
properly addressed by researcher.
The analysis on both levels includes 





































mention Vili Beroš, Davor Božinović 
and/or Alemka Markotić published on 
Večernji.hr and Index.hr from 24 Feb-
ruary to 11 May 2020. The starting date 
is the day when the first COVID-19 case 
was reported in Croatia and the end date 
is the day when children returned to 
schools and other lockdown measures 
were significantly reduced. The articles 
that mention Beroš, Božinović and/or 
Markotić in passing but make no further 
reference to any of them were excluded 
from the sample
Večernji.hr is the online edition of one 
of the two leading Croatian broadsheet 
newspapers, Večernji list, owned by the 
Styria publishing company. Večernji list 
has a reputation of a mainstream, con-
servative-leaning newspaper. Bilić et al. 
(2018) classify it as a center-right private 
news organization. Its main competitor 
is Jutarnji list owned by Hanza Media, 
which is commonly perceived as a libe-
ral-leaning newspaper. Bilić et al. (2018) 
identify it as a center-left private news 
organization. According to the Reuters 
Institute Digital News Report (2019), 
the main sources of print news in 2019 
were the left-leaning tabloid 24 sata ow-
ned by the Styria (37%, weekly use), Ju-
tarnji list (29%) and Večernji list (19%).12 
The online edition of Večernji.hr has a 
weekly reach of 20 percent and is the 
best ranked conservative-leaning news 
site, according to the Reuters Institute.
Index.hr is the second most popular 
online news site after 24sata.hr (weekly 
reach of 56% and 57% respectively) and 
the most popular native digital news site 
in Croatia, according to the Reuters In-
stitute (2019). It was established by jour-
nalist Matija Babić and has a reputation 
of an independent, liberal, and strongly 
oppositional outlet. Its editorial policy 
12 Peruško, Zrinjka (2019): Reuters Digital 
News Report. http://www.digitalnewsre-
port.org/survey/2019/croatia-2019/. (Acce-
ssed 20 August 2020).
towards HDZ's Government is aggres-
sively critical while Večernji.hr is more 
accommodating. Finally, Večernji list 
was part of the group that was invited 
to the Government meeting concerning 
the Covid-19 reporting while Index.hr 
was not.
The rationale behind the choice of 
outlets was to include two influential 
media that have significant market 
share, different ownership, contrasting 
ideological positions and opposite tone 
towards the Government. Future studies 
should include more outlets that should 
lead to more conclusive findings.
The final sample includes 475 articles, 
226 in Večernji.hr and 249 in Index.hr.
Findings
Media Representation of 
the Headquarters
The content analysis was conducted on 
475 articles. Vili Beroš is mentioned in 
217 articles (136 published on Večernji.
hr and 91 on Index.hr), Davor Božino-
vić in 177 (70 published on Večernji.hr 
and 107 on Index.hr) and Alemka Mar-
kotić in 123 (61 published on Večernji.
hr and 62 on Index.hr). The articles were 
first coded for the presence of positive 
sentiment towards Beroš, Božinović or 
Markotić; then they were coded for the 
presence of negative sentiment towards 
them and finally, the articles were coded 
for the presence of unpleasant topics or 
arguments that do not necessarily in-
volve criticism of analyzed people but 
may be potentially challenging to their 
image. For instance, articles that questi-
on if Croatia is testing enough, if there is 
enough medical equipment, or if nurses 
would be adequately paid for their work, 
were coded as positive in this category. 
The category was introduced because 
the pilot study indicated that the ove-

























was not only favorable but that the me-
dia were also quite reluctant to question 
decisions of the Headquarters and bring 
up provocative issues in the early days of 
the pandemic. The agreement between 
coders across all categories ranged from 
Cohen's kappa .823 to 1.00
The analysis has revealed that the 
sentiment towards three most promi-
nent figures who personified the bat-
tle against the virus, Vili Beroš, Davor 
Božinović and Alemka Markotić was 
exceptionally favorable. Figure 1 shows 
that Vili Beroš was the most praised per-
son, followed by Alemka Markotić and 
finally by Davor Božinović.
Interestingly, Index.hr that is rou-
tinely aggressively negative towards 
governing political establishment and 
especially towards HDZ, had more pos-
itive references to Beroš than Večernji.
hr (49.5 % compared to 38.9%). On the 
other hand, Index.hr had also signifi-
cantly more negative comments than 
Večernji.hr (11% compared to 5.6%). 
The most acclaimed person on Večern-
ji.hr was Alemka Markotić, with 42.6% 
articles that contain positive mention. 
Her portrayal on Index.hr was also 
overwhelmingly favorable, with 33.9 % 
of articles that contain some positive 
remark. Davor Božinović was the least 
praised member of the team, with 30% 
positive references on Večernji.hr and 
15% on Index.hr. Nevertheless, posi-
tive comments were convincingly more 
dominant than the negative ones. The 
highest total of 7.8% negative comments 
on both news sites was registered for 
Beroš, compared to 6.5% for Markotić 
and 6.2% for Božinović. As suggested in 
Figure 1, Index.hr was generally much 
more prone to negative comments than 
Večernji.hr. However, percentages are 
still surprisingly low, given the profile 
and fundamentally critical discourse of 
the site.
Figure 2 shows that negative com-
ments about Beroš, Markotić or Boži-
nović were almost nonexistent in Febru-
ary and March. The criticism started to 
show only in April, while the time span 
for May is too short to demonstrate the 
actual monthly trend.
In sum, results presented in this sec-
tion confirm the initial impression that 
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the news coverage of the main pandem-
ic envoys on Večernji.hr and Index.hr 
was exceptionally affirmative, especially 
during the first month of the crisis.
Inquiry into the presence of provoc-
ative and potentially damaging topics 
indicates that Index.hr was much more 
willing to address provocative issues and 
raise critical arguments (see Figure 3).
Figure 4 demonstrates that analyzed 
outlets were very conciliant in Febru-
ary and March while their tone became 
more confronting in April 2020.
However, the overall percentage of 
articles that contained contesting argu-
ments remained relatively low – 19.35% 
for Vili Beroš, 16.95% for Davor Boži-
nović and 10.57% for Alemka Markotić.
Media Representation of the 
Headquarters: Qualitative Findings
This section uses qualitative analysis to 
illustrate the findings from the previous 
section. Vili Beroš and Alemka Marko-
tić were mostly praised for their exper-
tise, communication skills and integrity. 
Their media portrayal was especially 
flattering in February and March 2020, 
at the beginning of the crisis.
On 18 March 2020 Večernji.hr wrote: 
'Vili Beroš has become the strongest 
link. The citizens simply trust him. His 
right and left hand, Alemka Markotić 
and Krunoslav Capak demonstrate su-
preme expertise and communication 
skills on every occasion'. On the same 
day, Index.hr (18 March 2020) quoted 
a letter from Croatian Patients' Associ-
ation in which the president of the As-
sociation praises Beroš for his 'profes-
sional leadership of the defense against 
the pandemic' and says: 'Your calming 
public appearances and actions will 
hopefully save many lives of Croatian 
citizens, especially of the elderly… We, 
the Association… are immensely grate-
ful for that'. Such messages of people's 
support and gratefulness were observed 
in both analyzed outlets but were ap-
parently present in other mainstream 
media as well. Prominent was also the 
practice of quoting Beroš's social me-
dia posts and reporting about mainly 
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hit on social media, Croats adore him', 
wrote Index.hr (26 March 2020) and 
carried messages of enchanted citizens: 
'Minister, thank you for your serenity 
and encouragement for all of us. You are 
our hope', 'You are the man who can be 
trusted', 'Vili for Prime Minister', etc. 
(Index.hr, 26 March 2020).
His 'calm' communication was the 
subject of numerous commentaries and 
news reports: 'New minister of health has 
swiftly gained huge public trust, mainly 
because of his calm and clear communi-
cation with the public' (Index, 22 March 
2020); 'Minister Beroš won sympathies 
of Croatian citizens during battle with 
coronavirus with his communication 
style' (Index, 23 March 2020); 'He is 
ready to answer all journalists' ques-
tions, he is not arrogant and he remains 
calm when many have succumbed to 
panics' (Večernji.hr, 18 March 2020), 
etc. Even when crisis communication 
of the Government in general was crit-
icized, Beroš was being praised as 'calm 
and relatively good communicator' (In-
dex.hr, 19 March 2020).
Similar was representation of Alem-
ka Markotić whose communication 
was described by Index.hr (26 Febru-
ary 2020) as 'professional and calm' and 
by Večernji.hr as 'clear, precise, calm 
and corroborated' (26 February 2020). 
Večernji.hr (11 March 2020) even sug-
gested she should be awarded a title of 
the 'communicator of the year'.
Davor Božinović was not praised as 
often as the other two, but he was also 
complimented for his communication 
and organizational abilities, especially 
by Večernji.hr: 'If we are talking about 
deserving and committed individuals, 
Davor Božinović… should not be de-
nied the merit of uniting superb experts 
into a harmonious team' (Večernji.hr, 18 
March 2020).
One of the labels commonly assigned 
to the members of the Headquarters 
that stood out in the analyzed articles 
but seems to stretch across different 
media, is a label of a hero. 'Hero of the 
nation who did not want to be a hero' is 
how Večernji.hr described Vili Beroš (30 
March 2020); 'A heroine, or just a wom-
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wrote Index.hr about Alemka Markotić 
(1 April 2020).
A trend has started when a boy named 
Šimun from village of Nuštar made a 
drawing of Beroš as Superman, Boži-
nović as Flash Gordon, Capak as Bat-
man and Markotić as Wonder Woman. 
The drawing was initially posted on 
Nuštar's official Facebook page, but it 
went viral when Beroš commented on 
the post: 'Dear Šimun, thank you. Take 
care of your family. You are their shield 
and my hero. Hi from Vili' (Index.hr, 
27 March 2020). Božinović also react-
ed to the boy's drawing. He shared the 
drawing along with a message that was 
reported all over, including Index.hr (27 
March 2020) and Večernji.hr (27 March 
2020): 'We'll do anything to return 
childhood to our children. Šimun, thank 
you for your support, we shall never get 
tired because of you'. Other children's 
creations also got significant media at-
tention, from drawings ('Heartbreaking: 
A girl from Murter drew a banknote 
with Alemka Markotić', Večernji.hr, 
26 March 2020) to Lego constructions 
('Davor Božinović sent a present to lit-
tle Dominik who used Lego figurines to 
impersonate the members of the Head-
quarters', Index.hr, 29 February 2020).
Creating bond with children was not 
the only technique used to 'human-
ize' Beroš, Markotić and Božinović. 
'Humanization' is a political commu-
nication technique commonly used 
to soften politician's image and to 
demonstrate that he or she is not only 
outstanding professional but also good 
and caring human being (see Grbeša, 
2010; Holtz-Bacha, 2004). Both Index.
hr and Večernji.hr 'humanized' them by 
sharing information from their private 
lives. For instance, they published sev-
eral interviews with Beroš's wife and we 
learned the names of Beroš's children 
and his dog. Alemka Markotić's life 
story and her war experience were also 
widely covered (e.g. 'She saved people in 
war', Index, 1 March 2020, etc.). Anoth-
er related technique used to portray the 
members of the Headquarters was ce-
lebrification (e.g. Driessens, 2013). For 
instance, both Index.hr and Večernji.hr 
shared a post of Croatian actress who 
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in love' (24 March 2020). Besides, Beroš 
was often referred to as 'my friend Vili' 
(e.g. Index, 26 March 2020), which is a 
direct reference to a famous American 
movie "Free Willy" (1993) that brings a 
story of a goodhearted whale who be-
friends a little boy.
Media representation of Croatian co-
rona envoys on Index.hr and Večernji.
hr has been exceptionally positive. This 
finding is in contrast with usually inten-
sively negative news coverage of political 
institutions in Croatia (Grbeša 2017). 
They were praised for their professional 
competence, communication skills and 
character. The image that was projected 
by both analyzed outputs in examined 
period is the one of credible experts and 
likable people that were awarded the 
status of 'heroes' that people can look 
up to. The media portrayal of them as 
both exceptional professionals and kind, 
caring people has possibly inspired pub-
lic sympathies and encouraged people's 
compliance with restrictive measures 
that have utterly shattered their lifestyle 
and daily routines. Outstanding person-
al rating of Vili Beroš and unexpected 
jump in public optimism measured 
in April 2020 speak in favor of this as-
sumption
However, the immaculate media im-
age of the Headquarters started to dete-
riorate in April 2020, probably because 
their decisions were perceived as incon-
sistent and speculative. For instance, 
they closed stores on Sunday with no 
convincing argument; they allowed 
church mass gatherings, while other 
venues were still closed, and people were 
encouraged not to leave their homes etc. 
In addition, they were repeatedly criti-
cized for politicizing their role and act-
ing as a megaphone of the ruling HDZ. 
Vojislav Mazzocco from Index.hr (2020) 
wrote: 'The Headquarters was presented 
as a super competent team that is going 
to save us. They did part of the job ex-
ceptionally well, and then they started 
to politicize and make moves that are so 
typical of Croatian bureaucracy – point-
less and harmful'. Perceived intrusion of 
politics into the actions of a team that 
was complimented for being 'profes-
sional', seems to have crucially tainted 
their reputation in the analyzed media.
The Rhetoric of the Headquarters
Preliminary analysis of statements 
of Vili Beroš, Davor Božinović and 
Alemka Markotić indicates that they 
were heavily relying on pandemic-rela-
ted communication strategies that were 
discussed in the theoretical chapter: use 
of fear appeals and metaphors of war, 
encouraging sense of togetherness and 
pandemic shaming.
Fear appeals
Fear appeals permeated the discourse of 
the main key communication envoys in 
Croatia during the first wave of the pan-
demic. Although initial messages were 
intended to reduce the panic and mini-
mize severity of the threat, the tone of 
the messages soon became more distur-
bing and consequently, more pressuring. 
Fear appeals were used on three levels: 
(a) to induce fear from the disease and 
its consequences on individual and so-
cial level, (b) to indicate that people who 
do not comply with the rules represent a 
danger, and (c) to threaten with sancti-
ons those who challenge the rules or un-
dermine attempts of the Headquarters.
As suggested by Wilke and Allen 
(2000), fear appeals are the most effec-
tive when combined with high-efficacy 
messages. The rhetoric of the Headquar-
ters was a constant mix of scare tactics 
and efficacy messages. For instance, 'un-
til now there were no cases among chil-
dren but now we have more and more 
cases among children, even some death 





































should not think that they are not in 
danger' (Alemka Markotić, Večernji.
hr, 11 April 2020), and then 'all these 
protective measures that we have been 
introducing wouldn't be efficient if cit-
izens did not comply with them' (Alem-
ka Markotić, 23 April 2020) or 'our des-
tiny is in our hands… If we act in ac-
cordance with the rules, we may prevent 
further spread' (Vili Beroš, Večernji.hr, 
30 March 2020).
The efficiency of Croatian approach 
was additionally accentuated by pro-
moting comparative statistics that sug-
gested that Croatia was more successful 
in combating the virus than some more 
advanced countries, such as France, Ita-
ly and Germany (Vili Beroš, Večernji.hr, 
27 March 2020).
Disobedience was represented as the 
biggest threat to the efficiency. Those 
breaking or challenging the rules were 
identified as an immediate threat to 
the wellbeing of individuals and soci-
ety. While addressing those who resist-
ed the measures, Alemka Markotić has 
authored some of the most memorable 
pandemic soundbites: 'Breaking self-iso-
lation is the same thing as having a gun 
and wanted to kill someone because you 
are irresponsible' (Večernji.hr, 16 March 
2020) and 'Maybe I was too gentle when 
I compared it to shooting a gun. I'll be 
more severe now – it is like shooting a 
riffle in a shopping mall, it is terrorism' 
(Večernji.hr, 20 March 2020). She also 
coined the term 'corona party' (Alemka 
Markotić, Večernji.hr, 21 March 2020) 
referring to the people who were leaving 
their homes and gathering in the open. 
The specific technique used by Mar-
kotić to identify those noncompliant 
as 'assassins' and 'terrorists' is known as 
'name calling' and entails assigning un-
attractive labels to individuals, groups 
or practices we want the public to con-
demn and reject (Sproul 2001).
The last set of fear appeals was based 
on threat of sanctions for breaking the 
rules. The most vocal about sanctions 
was, expectedly, Minister of Internal 
Affairs, Davor Božinović. He warned 
that 'Croatian police is going to monitor 
how people comply with the measures; 
if they don't they (the police) are going 
to react…', and 'I saw people walking in 
pairs this morning. This should not be 
happening. Keep the distance or police 
will punish you' (Index, 21 March 2020).
Finally, members of the Headquarters 
repeatedly condemned communication 
that was considered 'disinformation' 
or just hostile towards the efforts of 
the institutions: 'Information that have 
been circulating since yesterday that 
the number of infected is being con-
cealed are a deep insult to the people 
who have been protecting health of this 
country; institutions will know how to 
protect themselves, if these insults con-
tinue' (Alemka Markotić, Večernji.hr, 12 
March 2020). Interesting in that respect 
is a request from Davor Božinović re-
garding April Fool's Day to refrain from 
sharing jokes that could turn into disin-
formation. 'Let's keep humor funny', he 
pleaded (Večernji.hr, 31 March 2020).
Metaphors of War
As argued in earlier chapter, war metap-
hors are a distinctive feature of pande-
mic discourse. 'Covidian military me-
taphors', as Craig (2020) branded them, 
were abundantly present in Croatian 
public discourse during the first wave of 
the pandemic. Aside from concepts and 
expressions that are part of the global 
Covid-19 novel language, such as the 
"stay at home" (#ostanidoma) mantra, 
the use of words 'headquarters', 'isola-
tion' and 'quarantine' and exploitation 
of generic war metaphors, association 
to the state of war was achieved through 


























Davor Božinović (Večernji.hr, 31 
March 2020) asserted:
'Like 29 years ago, we are faced 
with unfamiliar and unpleasant sce-
nario… I can only wish for ourse-
lves to be responsible, solidary and 
united in empathy and taking care 
of each other as our soldiers were in 
the war… I would like to thank the 
police, civil protection services, army, 
and of course, health workers. All 
these services were first on the grou-
nd in the war, and they are first on the 
ground today'.
Similarly, Alemka Markotić (Večern-
ji.hr, 16 March 2020) commented: 'The 
Minister has declared mobilization and 
they (health workers) will go wherever 
they are needed… The Homeland War 
did not happen such a long time ago; 
the reaction and organization of our 
health service back then was exception-
al. Our people are very competent. We 
are good when circumstances require us 
to be'. She also pleaded: 'During the war 
we were all confined for months; why 
can't we endure now, in the comfort of 
our homes, with everything we have in 
there' (2 April 2020). In addition to the 
Homeland War, national unity was pro-
moted by evoking some other glorious 
and unifying moments in Croatian his-
tory, such as the performance of Croa-
tian soccer team at the World Champi-
onship in Russia in 2018: 'It all reminds 
me of the World Cup. It is nerve-reck-
ing. As we know, Croats were winning 
in the extra time and penalties. But you 
know it is unnerving. I wish we do not 
do that and that we win in those ninety 
minutes' (Alemka Markotić, Index.hr, 
1April 2020).
Aside from these specific nation-
al metaphors, examples of commonly 
used generic military metaphors in-
clude: 'battle with coronavirus' (e.g. Vili 
Beroš, Index.hr, 1 March 2020); 'I am 
only a soldier in this battle' (Vili Beroš, 
Index.hr, 17 March 2020); 'our strategy 
of defense' (e.g. Vili Beroš, Večernji.hr, 
15 March 2020): 'mobilization of health 
workers' (Vili Beroš, Večernji.hr, 15 
March 2020); 'first line of defense' (Vili 
Beroš, Večernji.hr, 25 March 2020); 'ev-
ery war has its spies (peta kolona)' (Vili 
Beroš, 25 March 2020) etc. Common 
was also honoring of professions whose 
contribution is crucial in times of war, 
such as the army, police, health workers 
and journalists. For instance, 'You jour-
nalists are doing a great thing and I con-
gratulate you on your professionality' 
(Vili Beroš, Večernji.hr, 4 April 2020).
Sense of togetherness
The discourse of togetherness in Croatia 
was built around shared sense of solida-
rity: 'We need to be compassionate', said 
Vili Beroš (Večernji.hr, 8 March 2020). 
However, what togetherness really me-
ant was collective compliance with pu-
blic health directives. Indeed, the most 
prominent aspect of togetherness was to 
praise those who comply with the rules 
and thus contribute to positive outcome 
of the battle against the virus. For in-
stance, 'our message is – respect our de-
cisions; that is the only way in which we 
can succeed. I would like to compliment 
all the citizens who comply with the ru-
les, I would like to compliment everyone 
who helps our elderly citizens' (Davor 
Božinović, Večernji.hr, 20 March 2020) 
or 'If we are right after Japan (in terms of 
the success rate), it means that we have 
perfect citizens' (Alemka Markotić, Ve-
černji.hr, 4 April 2020).
The technique that was abundantly 
used in constructing this idea of collecti-
vity and shared experience is 'bandwa-
gon'. It is aimed at creating an impres-
sion that 'everybody is doing it', which 
is why we should do it as well (Sproule 
2001: 136). In this case 'everybody' is all 





































praised for their resilience and discipli-
ne. For instance, 'The result we have is 
an accomplishment of all citizens who 
comply with the measures', (Davor Bo-
žinović, Večernji.hr, 11 April 2020) or 
'I compliment all health workers and 
citizens who follow instructions of the 
Headquarters because your self-disci-
pline led us to such good results. Thank 
you all!' (Vili Beroš, Večernji.hr, 19 April 
2020).
Aside from sharing the same notion 
of good behavior, 'togetherness' of good 
citizens is being constructed in relation 
to the 'others' who misbehave and un-
dermine rules and efforts of the Head-
quarters. Accentuating difference be-
tween 'us', who respect imposed frames 
of conduct and contribute to public 
health, and 'them' who represent a 
threat to public safety, the Headquarters 
was relying on 'negative solidarity' as the 
driving force behind collective pandem-
ic identity.
Pandemic shaming
Finger-pointing and attribution of bla-
me were standard techniques used to 
shame those who do not comply with 
the rules. For instance, 'I am proud, and 
we need to thank majority of Croats 
who have complied with the measures. 
However, those who have been obstru-
cting our measures, need to be critici-
zed' (Vili Beroš, Večernji.hr, 26 March 
2020).
Certain parts of the country were 
identified as particularly troublesome 
and were consequently subjected to geo-
graphical shaming. This is particularly 
true for the costal Mediterranean region 
of Dalmatia, known for its easy-going 
mentality and relaxed lifestyle. For in-
stance, Vili Beroš warned: 'The situation 
is good because citizens respect the mea-
sures. However, I am saddened by the 
news coming from Zadar, Šibenik and 
Split (cities in Dalmatia) where young 
people are gathering, drinking drinks 
and having fun. They are endangering 
themselves, health of their family and 
their nation' (Večernji.hr, 2 April 2020). 
Stereotyping people in Dalmatia as 'spe-
cial' and 'ifferent', and therefore proba-
bly more prone to ignorant behavior is 
implied in Alemka Markotić's patroniz-
ing statement: 'Our South, Dalmatia and 
Dubrovnik have been an avant-garde for 
centuries, in culture, sports, science, in 
everything, so we are sure they will be 
an avant-garde in defense against the vi-
rus' (Večernji.hr, 4 April 2020) and 'I ask 
them (Dalmatians) to be patient and to 
stop the spread of coronavirus; then we, 
the outsiders, we'll join them on our sea 
and we will not lose the tourist season" 
(Index.hr, 01 April 2020).
Conclusion
The goal of this study was to deconstruct 
media coverage of the people who were 
perceived as the faces of the battle aga-
inst coronavirus in Croatia and to test if 
and how 'corona communicators' were 
using pandemic-related strategies of 
persuasion to achieve compliance. The 
incentive for this study was the impre-
ssion that the coverage of the key com-
municators was exceptionally positive, 
that media tended to glorify the mem-
bers of the Headquarters and that accor-
ding to the relevant opinion polls, public 
tended to trust them.
The findings of the study point to three 
main conclusions. First, content analysis 
of the two online news sites, Večernji.hr 
and Index.hr showed that the coverage of 
Vili Beroš, Davor Božinović and Alem-
ka Markotić was indeed overwhelming-
ly positive during the first three months 
of the pandemic. Negative comments 
were surprisingly rare even on Index.
hr that was generally more critical than 
Večernji.hr but still far less than expect-

























ly harsh style of reporting. Moreover, 
during February and March, none of the 
news sites was really pushing issues or 
angles that challenged pandemic-relat-
ed policies or actions. Qualitative anal-
yses revealed that Beroš and Markotić 
were often praised for their competence, 
clarity, and sobriety, while Božinović 
was saluted for his organizational abil-
ities and determination. Humanization 
technique was used to present primarily 
Beroš and Markotić, but also Božinović, 
as not just outstanding professionals, 
but also as caring human beings. This 
was achieved mainly by sharing stories 
about their lives, hobbies, and families. 
Another strand of humanization was 
to report about children's affection for 
the members of the team and vice-ver-
sa. Children were crucial in branding 
the team as "heroes" because the media 
built on children's creations that por-
trayed Beroš, Markotić, Božinović and 
Capak as superheroes. In addition, the 
'heroism' was constructed around peo-
ple's admiration for the members of the 
team, especially for Vili Beroš who was 
often glorified as the 'savior'. These find-
ings are in line with evidence from other 
studies about the role of chief medical 
experts in health crisis risk communica-
tion and arguments about their 'celebri-
fication' in the 2020 pandemic.
Second, the Headquarters was, intui-
tively or strategically, promoting tactics 
and discourses that were observed in 
previous pandemics or registered in oth-
er countries during the 2020 pandemic. 
Fear was abundantly present in the dis-
course of all three examined individuals. 
It was used to scare the public about the 
disease and its consequences, to identify 
those who resist the rules as dangerous, 
and to threaten those who break the 
rules with sanctions. As recommended 
by risk communication scholars, fear 
appeals were commonly combined with 
'high-efficacy' messages. Military meta-
phors, as another prominent feature of 
the 'discourse of plague', were routine-
ly present in communication of Beroš, 
Božinović and Markotić. Aside from 
generic war metaphors, a particularity 
of Croatian corona communication is 
the use of associations to the Homeland 
War. These associations served to evoke 
the feelings of unity, discipline, endur-
ance, and victory. Finally, the idea of to-
getherness and solidarity permeated the 
rhetoric of Beroš, Božinović and Mar-
kotić and was often combined with the 
'shaming' of uncompliant citizens. Inter-
estingly, 'pandemic shaming' during the 
first wave in Croatia involved geograph-
ical stereotyping of Dalmatia, coastal 
region whose inhabitants are typically 
perceived as relaxed which in the dis-
course of the pandemic, translates into 
ignorant and unruly.
In sum, favorable media represen-
tation of Croatian corona envoys has 
probably encouraged people to trust 
their decisions and comply with restric-
tive measures that have suspended their 
freedoms and changed their life routines 
almost overnight. This suggestion is in 
line with previous findings about cor-
relation between experts' integrity and 
trust in times of pandemic. However, as 
soon it was perceived that decisions of 
the Headquarters may be driven by pol-
itics rather than expert judgments, the 
media image of the key communicators 
started to deteriorate. Over the course 
of time, the public image of the Head-
quarters has also declined. With the loss 
of trust in the Headquarters, Croatia 
has lost important asset in fighting the 
virus. Achieving compliance in 'the sec-
ond wave' with fallen heroes, exhausted 
citizens, and media back in the usual 
tracks of cynicism and negativity, will be 
a demanding mission.
Given the normally critical position of 
the news media towards political institu-





































in Croatia, these findings, although in-
dicative rather than conclusive, call for 
comprehensive research of the influ-
ence of crisis communication envoys 
and their mediated image on public and 
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Komuniciranje o pandemiji COVID-19: medijsko praćenje 
stožera i uporaba strategija uvjeravanja u Hrvatskoj
Sažetak hrvatsku je globalna pandemija COVID-a 19 pogodila u veljači 2020. Iza-
zovni zadatak komuniciranja tema vezanih za pandemiju dobilo je četvero ljudi 
povezanih sa stožerom civilne zaštite republike hrvatske. Cilj je ovog rada istražiti 
kako je troje članova bilo prikazano u medijima te jesu li i kako koristili strategije 
uvjeravanja uobičajene za stanja pandemija kako bi dobili pristanak javnosti. nalazi 
istraživanja ukazuju na to da je izvještavanje o ključnim komunikatorima tijekom 
prva tri mjeseca pandemije bilo uvjerljivo pozitivno. Štoviše, u ranoj fazi pandemi-
je nijedan od analiziranih portala nije inzistirao na temama ili perspektivama koje 
propituju politike ili mjere stožera vezane za pandemiju. analizom retorike ključnih 
ljudi koji su komunicirali o koronavirusu utvrđeno je da su oni prihvatili strategije 
uvjeravanja tipične za komuniciranje u pandemijama, ponajprije uporabu poruka 
straha, vojnih metafora i poruka koje inzistiraju na "zajedništvu" i "pandemijskom 
sramoćenju". autorica zaključuje kako su pozitivna medijska prezentacija komuni-
katora i strategije uvjeravanja koje su koristili vjerojatno potaknuli ljude da vjeruju 
njihovom odlukama i pristanu na restriktivne mjere koje su suspendirale njihove 
slobode i gotovo preko noći promijenile njihove životne navike.
Ključne riječi pandemija COVID-a19, koronavirus, komunikacija, strategije uvjera-
vanja, stručnjaci, poruke straha, stožer, hrvatska
